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Censorship Sensing:
The Capabilities and
Implications of China’s Great
Firewall Under Xi Jinping
Emily Quan

Totaling over 989 million users at the end of 2020, Chinese Internet users interact
with unprecedent amounts of data, communication, and media (Xu 2020). It is a far
cry from 1987, when the first email was sent from China to the Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology. The message in the email, later popularized on QQ desktops, was this:
“Across the Great Wall, we can reach every corner of the world” (越过长城，走向世
界, Yuèguò Chángchéng, Zouxiàng Shìjiè) (Internet Archive 2013).
This prophecy has certainly come true as China approaches a billion domestic
Internet users. However, it also speaks to a certain irony that stems from the
Chinese government’s extensive censorship across its networks: even as the Internet
continues to function as a tool to connect individuals across the globe, how Chinese
Internet access is partitioned off is creating an increasingly insular community within
the country. This paper will begin with a brief history of the Internet in China and
the corresponding evolution of Chinese technological censorship efforts. It will then
discuss our current understanding of Chinese censorship systems as understood
by outside network and censorship researchers and will explore the capabilities of
its current implementation. It will then pivot to analyze what the implications of
the censorship system’s understood abilities mean for understanding Xi Jinping’s
leadership and examine economic and diplomatic consequences of Chinese
censorship under Xi.
Although this paper necessarily focuses on the technical aspects of these
networking systems in some areas, a computer networking or technical background
is not necessary to understand the implications of the described capabilities. Focus
on the technical implementation will only be described to outline basic abilities and
limitations. Definitions will be provided to make important technical terms accessible
to readers who do not stem from a technical background.
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China’s Internet and Censorship History
China’s relationship with technology is all the more incredible when we consider
its meteoritic rise over the past few decades. Although China has boasted significant
scientific advances throughout history, it arrived relatively late to the game of modern
science and technology. Its lack of modern military warfare in the 1800s directly
contributed to the Century of Humiliation, during which foreign powers that took
advantage of its resources and wealth (Joseph 2019, 52). Although the Republic of
China began the advent of modern science in China as key Chinese figures received
their education abroad and founded schools and universities in China, many of these
institutions moved to Taiwan after the Communist Party gained power in 1949. Under
Mao’s rule, nuclear and satellite technology were the only regions that experienced
significant scientific advancement (Joseph 2019, 91). The disastrous policies that
resulted in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution meant that China’s
populace was too consumed with fulfilling the Party quotas and dealing domestic
shortages to make much progress in scientific advancements.
But if China has arrived relatively late in using technology to cement gains in
international power, it has also excelled in catching up. Once it was ready to position
itself for greater growth and economic development, it seized the opportunity to
leverage science and technology as a vehicle for ascendancy. Science and technology
were a pillar of the Four Modernizations announced by Deng Xiaoping for economic
development in 1975, and in the period since then, it has positioned itself as one of
the world’s leading STEM leaders (Joseph 2019, 128). One measure that illustrates this
is that, by some counts, China is the largest producer of scientific articles (Tollefson
2018).
China’s relationship with the Internet has followed similar trends. Because the
Internet began as an American government-related project, China did not play a
significant part in the formation of key Internet infrastructure entities and services.
However, in the ensuing years, China has seized the opportunity to both capitalize
on providing services and amassing soft power. These efforts have included heavy
investment in telecommunications infrastructure both domestically and in at least 16
countries as part of its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, an extension of Beijing’s Belt
and Road Initiative strategy (Kurlantzick 2021). Its efforts to place Chinese needs and
users at the center of Internet operations have also resulted in the development of its
censorship model.
Although the first email from China was sent in 1987, the Internet did not arrive
in China until 1994 under the leadership of Jiang Zemin. In parallel with the Internet’s
release, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in China worked on a project known as
the Golden Shield, which was released in 2000 during a trade show in Beijing (Torfox
2011). The project aim was to act as a comprehensive surveillance system that would
link all citizens’ records at various levels. However, as the technology continued
to advance at a rapid pace, the system shifted from linking information to filtering
specific content for individuals in an expansive surveillance system.
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The Golden Shield project is colloquially referred to as the Great Firewall of
China (GFW). Co-located within the GFW is a project known as the Great Cannon,
which is an offensive Internet attack tool that has been used to launch distributed
denial-of-service attacks against websites that cause severe political problems for
China (Marczak et al. 2015). An example of this is when the Great Cannon was used
to attack GitHub, a popular web-based code hosting service, in 2015, perhaps due
to the fact that GitHub hosts resources that detail how to circumvent censorship
(Marczak et al. 2015). The Great Cannon has not been deployed extensively and has
generally been used in response to what it considers “foreign hostile actors.”
Under current President Xi Jinping’s leadership, censorship efforts have
continued with the proliferation of the Internet. In 2013, his first year in office, it
was reported that over two million people were used as “public opinion analysts”
to manually censor posts and observe user activity (Hunt and Xu 2013). Other
individuals were hired to make patriotic posts and comments, introducing a barrage
of CCP-positive material into Chinese cyberspace. Continued Chinese propaganda
and censorship efforts make use of both human operators and algorithms to promote
Party lines and censor sensitive topics.
Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has seen an increase in censorship
across all forms of media. One example is that Chinese internet companies are required
to sign a document entitled “Public Pledge on Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics
for the China Internet Industry” (Albert and Xu 2017). Previous workarounds for
bypassing censorship technologies, such as the use of virtual private networks (VPNs),
have been blocked. In February 2016, Xi also announced increased restrictions for
state media to better adhere to Party doctrine. As China’s censorship efforts continue
to develop and expand, the government’s central purpose is to safeguard the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP) will, authority, and unity (Zhou 2020).

Research Objectives and Limitations
Although significant research on the technical capabilities and weaknesses of the
GFW has taken place over recent years, much of this research has only been examined
through a technical or computer networking basis. The purpose of this paper is to
present a holistic picture of the extent to which the GFW filters information on a
regional, platform-specific, and time-sensitive basis, and to contextualize it within
past and current Chinese political events.
This section begins with a necessary disclaimer for understanding the limitations
of research performed to understand the GFW. Researchers experience limitations
regarding the GFW due to several reasons. Much of the research surrounding the
GFW relies on testing its keyword filtering capabilities, which means that researchers
test specific words within Chinese networks and record which entries experience
censorship. The consequence of this method is that it primarily relies on guessand-check. New discoveries in this area are generally made using suggestions from
knowledgeable Chinese citizens or political scientists who study these areas or rely
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on accidental discoveries based on sample search queries. For example, Rambert et
al. discovered that including the English version of the word “search” in an HTTP
query (the data sent to a server when a user navigates to different webpages) resulted
in the query being subjected to an expanded blocklist of words (Rambert et al. 2021).
However, this discovery was only made through empirical methods.
Another limitation is that many researchers lack the ability to establish network
infrastructure in China to directly test queries and other statistics from Chinese Internet infrastructure. As research from Rambert et al. has also shown, routing locations do make a difference in the types of queries that are censored (Rambert et al.
2021). Additionally, queries that researchers use do not always mirror natural banter
or entries that most users might enter, meaning that researchers’ data results may
ultimately be subject to more or less censorship than the average Chinese netizen.
Although serious researchers in this area tend to use Chinese infrastructure to test
their queries, there is not a definitive way to ensure that these servers are not experiencing disproportionately more or less censorship than the average Chinese Internet
user (Christin 2021).
Timing also plays a factor into researchers’ results; many of the censorship
implementations used for the Great Firewall vary week to week and have been shown
to have tighter or varied controls during significant Party events or sensitive breaking
news topics, such as the disappearance of famed Chinese tennis player, Peng Shuai
(Mozur, Xiao, Kao, and Beltran 2021). Based on this, some studies may be skewed
in their results based on global occurrences that may result in greater censored
material during certain points of time. It is also possible that research machines and/
or IP addresses may experience disproportionate censorship due to the number of
controversial topics they periodically send. However, this is generally addressed
in research findings, and researchers have not reported inconsistencies that would
suggest such directed interference (Rambert et al. 2021).

Great Firewall Implementation
Contrary to the monolithic approach that its name suggests, the GFW does
not actually constitute a single firewall. Rather, Chinese censorship utilizes a wide
variety of techniques and is implemented at different stages of data transfer. The
techniques that the GFW uses include, but are not limited to: IP range bans, URL
filtering, DNS tampering, deep packet filtering, man-in-the-middle attacks, and TCP
reset attacks (Asim 2021). This section will focus on several key techniques used as
part of deterrence implementations.
An important feature of Chinese Internet censorship relies on DNS (Domain
Name Service) poisoning, which is used to unconditionally block websites listed on
a blacklist. DNS poisoning, which is also referred to as DNS tampering, is carried
out by storing incorrect or fake information in the storage of a server, causing users
to be redirected to the wrong website. In the case of Chinese censorship, a DNSpoisoned website will appear to be blocked or seem as if it has difficulty loading.
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The top three categories of blocked domains are “business,” “pornography,” and
“information technology” (Hoang et al. 2021, 3385). Approximately 311k domains
are blocked daily within China, although it is worth noting that only around 1.3%
of these domains rank among the top 100k most popular websites. Within the subdomain of “information technology” are many popular global websites such as
Google, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, which have been effectively replaced in
Chinese cyberspace with Chinese copycat equivalents, such as WeChat, Sina Weibo,
and Tencent QQ.
The blacklist of domains is dynamic, which is supported by the fact that
COVID-19 related domains have also been censored (Rambert et al. 2021). Changes
to the list also rely on manual and automated additions. This is supported by the fact
that several higher education domains were also included in the block list that are
targeted specifically without justification. Although the inclusion of many of these
institutions’ domains make sense based on their research on Chinese censorship
and the Chinese government, other very specific entries, such as the sub-domain
cs.colorado.edu (which is not currently in use), point to the fact that the list relies on
manual and automated additions.
Several studies have reported the use of a penalty box in Internet transactions
that contain filtered keywords (Xu, Mao, and Halderman 2011). This is an effective
deterrence mechanism: if a user submits a request that includes a filtered keyword,
then there is a 50–75% chance that requests submitted in the next 90 seconds
afterwards will also be blocked, even if the subsequent requests don’t contain filtered
keywords (Rambert et al. 2021). The GFW further strengthens its Web censorship
via HTTP/HTTPS filtering by deploying two separate censorship systems (Bock,
Naval, Reese, and Levin 2021). The second system has been deployed since at least
September 2019, and functions as a “backup censorship” system that runs in parallel
to the main system and often blocks Web traffic that remained undetected by the first.
In addition to Internet filtering and blocking, chat clients in popular applications
and games are also subject to censorship. A key difference for censorship performed
for chat clients and games is that the words and material blocked is often company
dependent. An analysis of top-downloaded mobile games in China showed that
there was no single list of filtered keywords; the three statistically significant factors
between censored lists were approval date, publisher, and developer (Knockel, Ruan,
and Crete-Nishihata 2017). This points to a more decentralized model of the GFW
than generally imagined, though at the same time points to evidence that regulation
of censorship for games is still enforced via centralized regulations (due to the
correlation with publisher date).

The Nature of Censored Material
Researchers have generally relied on compiled word lists and websites that include entries that have been blocked in the past to conduct future network observation studies. Categories of observed blocked Wikipedia entries include: the topic of
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censorship; censorship circumvention; sensitive events, such as Chinese protests; the
Falun Gong (a religious movement that is regularly persecuted by the Chinese government), sensitive terms involving the government, such as the term “Princeling,”
which refers to the children of high-level government officials; various magazines,
media, newspapers, and organizations; dissidents; certain political officials; regional
issues that involve Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, or Tibet; and Tiananmen (“Complete GFW Rulebook” 2021). Studies examining filtered keywords generally rely on
word lists such as the Wikipedia 2014 and 2020 lists of censored words, which have
similar categories with similarly sensitive people, organizations, or events that the
Chinese government hopes to avoid.
There are various instances where users are subject to different filtered keyword
lists. One is that users that submit search results inside of China are subject to different filtering restrictions than users outside of China. For example, foreign users
have the terms “Coronavirus,” “Remdesivir,” and “Epidemic” filtered, whereas users
located inside of China do not; this points to different objectives for filtering different
audiences (Rambert et al. 2021).
Another instance is that users that have the English word “search” in HTTP requests are subject to an expanded keyword filtering list. For example, “法轮” (Falun
Gong, a Chinese religious movement) is blocked when the English word “search”
is included, but is not when the word is not present. Other variations of the word
search, including words for “search” in Chinese, did not trigger the expanded blocklist (Rambert et al. 2021). Individuals who include the English word for “search” likely
have more exposure to foreign information or influences, and also likely have enough
fluency in English to understand articles stored on English webpages. Therefore, this
discrepancy is likely indicative of the Chinese government’s desire to detect and deter individuals from specific backgrounds from learning about sensitive topics.
Although the discussion of filtering up to this point has been focused on keyword
filtering (blocking websites, requests, or content based on specific words or phrases),
an analysis of filtering based on a user’s location, profile, and/or other media used,
such as pictures, has also been performed. Based on this analysis, the strongest
predictor of censored posts on Weibo, a popular Chinese social media platform, was
negative sentiment (Arefi 2020, 13).

Proactive and Reactive Filtering
GFW filtering has also been shown to be dynamic based on global and domestic
events. Changes to filtered keywords, for example, are reflected in significant
weekly changes that take into account recent events that censors hope to block. An
interesting aspect of this is that keywords are also regularly removed from lists when
they become irrelevant – showing that the government recognizes a need to provide
Chinese netizens with a degree of Internet independence. The number of words that
are changed on a regular basis are substantial: from a blocklist of about 1,400 words,
some regions experienced hundreds of these words were removed or added based
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on the week and the region of the country (Rambert et al. 2021). This indicates that
some regions may be subject to more robust oversight on censorship filtering than
others, which also points to either sensitivity in regional control or a decentralization
of censorship oversight. For example, Guangzhou experienced only one or two
keyword changes to a list of over 1000 blocked words over a week, whereas Shanghai
had 600 changes to this list during the same week (Rambert et al. 2021).
The time-sensitive filtering aspects of the GFW are most on display during two
types of events: significant government events, which involve proactive filtering,
and global or domestic events that spark outrage or dissent, which involve reactive
filtering. An analysis of censored WeChat messages during China’s 19th National
Communist Party Congress in 2017 showed that even potentially neutral and positive
messages that pertained to sensitive topics, such as Xi Jinping and the military,
were blocked in the days leading up to and following the event. The top categories
of blocked phrases and words were: Xi Jinping, references to a power transition,
leadership, and Party policies and ideologies. Phrases blocked that revolved around
Xi specifically included references to his desire to stay in power, critiques of his
leadership, and his family (Ruan et al. 2020, 513). However, although many of the
critical phrases remained blocked, around 50% of the tested phrases were unblocked
a year after the Congress, which shows that censors recognize the importance of a
certain degree of information flow is necessary to placate users.
Reactive censorship is more difficult to measure because such events occur
without warning and the dynamics of netizen actions during/following an event are
similarly volatile. However, events such as controversy over the recent disappearance
of famous Chinese tennis star, Peng Shuai, show reactive censorship at work. After
Peng’s initial controversial post was deleted from Weibo, China’s version of Twitter,
censors quickly deleted other posts referring to her claims and banned a large scope
of adjacent topics, including the topic of “tennis.” Xiao Qiang, a researcher from
UC Berkeley, noted that several hundred keywords were banned in relation to the
incident (Mozur et al., n.d.). The aftermath of this event and the subsequent relaxation
of censorship around Peng Shuai will remain to be seen, and will likely depend on
future international engagement and events.

Focusing on Narrative Control
The government has realized that in its pursuit of a unified China, control over
the narratives perpetuated over Chinese networks takes precedence over granular
control of information. After the establishment of the People’s Republic in China in
1949, information that entered and exited China was tightly controlled. It was not
until the Reforms and Opening-up period under former President Deng Xiaoping
that China became open to foreign exchanges, and even then, foreign nationals
were still viewed with suspicion in context of the prior humiliations that China had
endured at the hands of foreign powers (Sina News 2003). However, with the scope
of the Internet, the Chinese government recognizes that even if it is able to deploy
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advanced censorship mechanisms to monitor and scrub certain pieces of unwanted
information, it is no longer able to vet every source of new information that enters its
borders. It has therefore also opted for control over how information is perceived to
accompany its technological censorship efforts.
If the government can control the narrative, then it can shape the lens through
which people filter information, and which will determine how much information
will spread. Both concepts work hand in hand. If the government narrative is
repeated and rigorously taught from a young enough age, then the populace will
not be interested in researching additional information, even if it is possible to
obtain. On the other hand, if the information flow into China can be shaped in
such a way that almost all data supports or does not heavily discount the official
narrative, then it strengthens the official narrative because alternate viewpoints are
not easily obtained. This point is supported by the alternative keyword list when
the English word “search” is included in search requests (Rambert et al. 2021). This
forms a key principle of success behind the Chinese Firewall: information does not
have to be blocked absolutely. Making information harder to obtain or access can act
as a sufficient deterrent for most people. This principle is clear when we consider
the “penalty box” mentioned earlier, which blocks traffic after a user searches for a
blocked keyword (Xu et al. 2011).
The reach with which the Chinese government has implemented censorship
through the GFW is extensive for filtering traffic coming outside of China but is
surprisingly dynamic within China. The difference in block lists for international
vs. domestic traffic shows that China has different objectives in its censorship.
Censorship of outside traffic controls China’s image to the outside world, whereas
domestic censorship is used to prevent undesirable information leaks.
Many of the studies that focused on variations in filtered keywords also found
significant variations between the lists companies and service providers used. This
suggests that censorship is generally decentralized between various entities. This
decentralization extends to regional variations as well, as evidenced by the earlier
example that shows censorship differences between Guangzhou and Shanghai.
Although general guidance on what to block is likely issued from a centralized CCP
authority, it has been noted that it is likely that much of the granular control of specific
words being censored or not is most likely up to individual network administrators
(Christin 2021). This explains the variability of some of the censorship observed
throughout the research.
The implication of traffic through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for major
cities such as Beijing and Shanghai experiencing significantly less censorship is that
the Chinese government understands that censorship within its intranet is more
sensitive, and that it must be wary of allowing “maximal” search/message freedom
to its citizens (so long as the data originates from a relatively safe source within
the country, as opposed to traffic coming from abroad). Little to no censorship was
observed for traffic between Hong Kong and international entities, which supports
the idea that the government minimizes its use of censorship to placate its citizens.
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This finding is especially interesting when we consider that the primary challenge
of information control for the Chinese government may come from within its borders.
Many Westerners incorrectly assume that the primary challenge of information
control comes from the outside and assume that Chinese who are unaware of some of
the more sensitive points of their country’s history would immediately turn against
their government if exposed to information about events such as Tiananmen. This
is not necessarily the case. One author noted informal evidence against this in 2014
with students from prestigious Beijing universities such as Tsinghua and Peking
University. When the author asked the students about their knowledge about the
Tiananmen incident, many of the students were unaware of what had happened; in
other cases, students defended the government’s stance, even if they saw it as rather
extreme. The reality is that “the propaganda apparatus has laid the groundwork so
well that most students simply have no interest in questioning the government’s
version of events” (Lim 2015, 88).
The larger existential threat for the Chinese government may be that it is a victim
of its own success. The exponential rise in standards of living across the board has
set up high expectations for the future. At the turn of the century, China’s roadways
were dominated by bicycles; today, automobiles dominate the highways. Real
weekly wages have increased 8-fold between 2000 and 2016, from 100 to 800 yuan
(Zhang and Wu 2016). China’s per capita GDP has more than doubled from 2010 to
2020, from $4,600 to $10,500 (Goldkorn 2021). President Xi has promised to eliminate
inequality and continue China’s prosperity, but many factors that remain out of his
control may stand in the way of his delivery.
Against this backdrop, Chinese social media boards and blogposts are effective
amplifiers for citizens to express discontent. The sheer amount of Internet users can
be encapsulated in the popular term 人肉搜索 (Rénròu Sōusuo), which describes the
powerful research capabilities Web bloggers and users to uncover and investigate
information. Although the government is masterful at censoring data at will, it is
also aware that heavy-handedness in censorship efforts decreases trust in citizen
platforms, which it uses to measure public opinion. It understands that there is a
delicate balance between deciding when to censor information and when to allow the
public to blow off steam; too much, and leadership may lose control and credibility
in the narrative.
Because the government walks a thin line between control and consent, Chinese
netizens are able to successfully use the Web to advocate for issues that are important
to them, such as environmental concerns and corruption. Outcry over unpopular
decisions by local officials also results in greater scrutiny, allowing citizens to
effectively hold many lower-level officials accountable even as top leadership
remains taboo (Downey 2010). At the same time, the Chinese government is able to
effectively channel the public outrage into channels that are not sensitive to the CCP’s
positions. For example, during the Diaoyu protests in 2012, the Chinese government
said nothing while citizens gathered to protest against Japanese businesses (BBC
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2012). As protestors united behind Chinese nationalism and railed against Japan in
a cause that the Party supported, the government allowed the protests to continue.

Future Implications
As President Xi seeks to shape a “unified and resurgent China,” he will continue
to leverage technology to promote this narrative within the country (Economy 2022).
Censorship is a crucial tool for ensuring that the conformity of opinion works towards,
not against, the country’s goals. As China continues to assume regional power over
information access and dissemination, it is also hoping to shift the traditional way in
which the Internet is regulated: as China’s computer networks grow more insular,
it is establishing its own form of Internet governance within its borders that trumps
international norms.
Despite the fact that netizens are given some independence in the range of topics
they can discuss, the extensive number of banned words and phrases that involve
President Xi Jinping are in line with his current rise in power and authority. With the
rise of Xi’s cult of personality, which has been compared to a similar craze around
Mao, the outsized sensitivity in censorship around his policies and power reflects
either a fragility in his grip on power or a consolidation of authority—and it is
possible that the answer is a mixture of both.
In parallel with how Mao effectively “Sinicized” Marxist-Leninist principles
for application for China, Xi has also declared a similar vision for China’s cyber
future. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s regulator
and censor, announced the government’s intentions to ideologically censor and
verify that algorithms adhere to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics, specifically regarding “internet information service algorithms at
consumer-facing internet companies” (Goldkorn 2021). Through this announcement,
Chinese leadership is signaling its intentions to further ensure that the Internet serves
to further the CCP’s purposes—not the other way around.
As Xi continues to promote domestic businesses as part of China’s rise, Chinese
censorship of the Internet has provided a significant opportunity for Chinese
companies to fill in a vast consumer niche in technological services. The fact that
many popular Western websites are blocked is not a loss that is largely felt within
the country because there are thriving Chinese equivalents for users. This may serve
as a successful precedent for Chinese companies to capture markets in other sectors.
Many Western companies that once operated in China have recently withdrawn from
the market, citing difficulties imposed by the government. If the Chinese government
recognizes that Chinese companies are able to replace other markets successfully,
then they may continue to push for regulation that favors Chinese leadership and
corporations. A smaller-scale example of this is Manner Coffee, a coffee shop brand
that could be positioned to rival and eventually replace Starbucks as the provider in
the market. As Xi Jinping continues to advance his Common Prosperity policies and
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favors domestic consumption, the success of Internet companies in satisfying their
markets may serve as an encouraging precedent for his strategy (Che 2021).
The implications of Xi’s vision extend well beyond China. In its dealings with
other countries regarding the Digital Silk Road, a technological branch of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative, Beijing has provided training on how to censor Internet efforts
(Kurlantzick 2021). This points to the larger issue of how China is exporting digital
authoritarianism, and how its censorship efforts may not remain isolated to its own
citizens. Additionally, as China becomes more confident as a leader on the world
stage, it may have less reservations about displays of offensive cyber capabilities.
The Great Cannon, an attack system co-located with the GFW, may be viewed as
an increasingly attractive option for Chinese leaders wishing to push back on
corporations or governments who fail to cooperate.
China may not be content to showcase its might through soft power as it takes
an expanded leadership role on the global stage. It may see fit to make use of its
offensive Great Cannon capabilities as those whom it deems “hostile foreign powers”
continue to threaten China’s harmonizing model. For example, increasing tensions
over Taiwan between China and America and its allies may result in unprecedented
cyber campaigns as a prelude to other military escalations. Such a possibility is not
remote: Taiwan is already reporting around five million cyberattacks and probes
daily, the overwhelming majority of which originate from the mainland (AFP 2021).
As China seeks reunification, it could see the use of the Great Cannon against the
Taiwanese government as an excellent symbolic move to neutralize some of its
Internet capabilities. The last significant usage of the Great Cannon against GitHub
was a significant message to the world: by targeting one of the world’s largest
codebases, China directly signaled to the West that any of its technology that stands
in the way of the CCP is fair game.
The continued decoupling of Chinese Internet users from the rest of the world
through censorship exacerbates a significant rift between China and its counterparts.
Complete control comes at a cost for China: the more that Chinese censorship is
actively deployed, the more it advertises its insecurities to the outside world and risks
stoking the outrage of its own netizens. However, it is a cost that it is increasingly
eager to pay. Subsequently, outsiders will need to pay careful attention to changes in
Chinese censorship models as its model is successfully exported to other authoritarian
regimes to silence dissent and perform surveillance. As the CCP grows more insular
in its dealings with the outside world, understanding the topics that are important
to them through empirical observation will become critical to understanding its
domestic and international aims—seeing both the image it wishes to present and the
image it seeks to hide.
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